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moral virtue? I believe that we have yet to ask tile
question.' We have yet to ask it despite tile fact tIlat
tIlis question could yield an answer of some importance
for animal and environmental ethics. If animals prove
to have intellectual and moral virtue of their own, we
may well have a new ground on which to base a
teleological ethics for animals.2 And of course if animal
virtue differs from our own, we may by comparison
gain new insights into human virtue.
In tllis essay I wish to argue that some animals other
tIlan human beings do possess intellectual and moral
virtue of a sort. I shall focus our discussion on
intellectual as well as moral virtue, for not only is
intellectual virtue itself a virtue, but also virtue of this
type is a prerequisite for moral virtue. And I shall limit
our present discussion to other primates of only one
species. What we shall see is not that these primates
possess intellectual and moral virtue witll the full
panoply of human virtue but that they possess what we
might call rudimentary virtue akin to human virtue in
significant respects.

I

In this paper I would like to ask whether animals other
than hwnan beings may have virtue or not. One might
think at first that other animals could not have any virtue
because virtue is a distinctly hwnan quality. Only humans
would appear to possess an intellect witll the capacity
for practical understanding, deliberation, and choice. And
consequently only humans would have the capacity to
perfonn good actions and to acquire good habits.
Yet if one reflects even for a moment, one cannot
help but realize that other animals do indeed possess a
practical intellect of some kind. These animals have
some practical knowledge, and they deliberate about
their activities and choose them. Philosophers have
long recognized these facts. Even Aristotle tllOught
that animals have practical wisdom, for example
(Nicomachean Ethics 6. 7.).Hobbes had no doubt that
some animals are more prudent tllan children (Leviathan
1. 3.). And Hwne argued that animals reason in the same
way that humans do (Enquiry concerning Human

II

To show tllat other animals possess it, we probably
ought to begin with a definition of virtue. We might do
well to look for our definition in the works of the
classical philosophers, for tIlese philosophers developed

PHILOSOPHY

Understanding 9.).
But if they have a practical intellect, dootller animals
also possess tlle capacity to develop intellectual and
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rather sophisticated virtue ethics. Aristotle especially
presents a clear and concise definition of moral virtue.
He argues that virtue of this sort is a habit giving a
capacity for choice, lying on a relative mean, which is
defined by a principle of practical wisdom (Eth. 2. 6.
1l06b36-1107a2).
With the last clause of his definition, Aristotle
indicates that an intellectual virtue is a prerequisite for
moral virtue. Practical wisdom he defines as a habit
yielding a practical capacity, following from a principle,
and concerned with good and evil (Eth. 6. 5. 1140b46). Wisdom of this kind concerns good and evil and
follows from principle because it includes two
intellectual virtues itself. With practical intuition one
can intuit practical facts, most likely including means
and ends (Eth. 6. 7. 114IbI4-2I and 11. 1143a35II43b5). An intuition of a practical end is of course a
principle concerned with good or evil. 3 And with
deliberation one can determine what means are
appropriate for attaining an end. These means follow
from our intuition of an end, for we assume an end when
we deliberate (Eth. 3. 3. llI2bll-24).
Practical wisdom also yields a practical capacity
because it gives one the ability to control desire and to
perform good actions (Eth. 1.13. l102b25-28 and
l102b29-1103aI). By repeatedly performing them one
can also use good actions to develop good moral habits
(Eth. 2. 1. l103a26-1103b25).
Aristotle's first clause in his definition indicates that
moral virtue influences our choice. Any habit of course
inclines us to an action of some sort (Eth. 2. 2. 11043171l04b3). But a good habit would incline us to good
action. Virtue is indeed a capacity to engage in good
action, and good action is an end in itself. An action of
such sort itself is what constitutes our happiness (Eth.
1. 7. 1097b22-1098aI8).
The second clause indicates that moral virtue is a
habit which is moderate. A habit of this sort inclines
us to choose moderation in our actions. Moderate
actions are those which are themselves means and not
extremes. Actions which are moderate tend to preserve
our nature, for actions which are excessive or defective
tend to destroy us (Eth. 2.2. 1l04all-27). The mean
is also relative to the one who possesses it (Eth. 2. 6.
1l06a24-1106b7).
Now, many philosophers would probably be
reluctant to argue that animals other than humans
possess virtue in this classical sense. But contemporary
ethologists have found evidence to indicate that some
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other primates do in fact possess a capacity, if only a
minimal one, to develop virtue akin to classical virtue.
The evidence suggests that other animals possess
practical knowledge and that they can use their
knowledge to control some instincts and to develop
them into habits. But the evidence does not suggest
that these animals have a conception similar to that of
a relative mean.
We shall consider what Jane Goodall has recently
discovered about chimpanzees living in the wild.
Goodall has studied these primates in their natural
habitat longer than anyone else. Her observations cover
a continuous period of over twenty-five years (Goodall,
ch. 1, pp. 9 and 10).4 We shall not consider chimpanzees
raised and trained in a household or a laboratory. These
animals may indeed possess virtue, but their virtue need
not be entirely of their own making. Many habits
acquired by them are probably due not solely to their
own intelligence but also to the intelligence of those
who train them. 5
Chimpanzees of course are well known to possess
social knowledge which is rather acute. But what is not
so wei! known is that chimpanzees also exhibit
intentionality and deliberation in their social
interactions. Consider an illustrative observation of a
minor conflict. A young female who has low social rank
approaches an adult female who has high social rank.
The juvenile tries to take a banana from the adult. The
adult threatens and the juvenile retreats. After a short
time, the juvenile returns and threatens the adult, and
the adult retreats. Following the juvenile is an old adult
male who outranks the adult female. This adult male
also has an alliance of long standing with the juvenile
female (Goodall, ch. 19, pp. 566-7).
These animals surely have practical intuitions about
the individual identities of one another, for they know
their relative positions and other relationships within
an hierarchy. They are aware not only of the
relationships between themselves and other individuals
but also of the relationships between other individuals.
For the juvenile female understands the hierarchic
relationship between the adult male and the adult
female, and the adult female understands the alliance
between the adult male and the juvenile female.
(Goodall, ch. 19. p. 570).
These animals also use their social knowledge to
form intentions and to deliberate about their actions.
The juvenile female intends to take a banana from the
adul t female, and she uses the adult male as a means to
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fulfilling her intention. After defending it, the adult
female abandons her original intention to retain tlle
banana. She fails to find a means to fulfill tllis end
(Goodall, ch. 19, pp. 566-7). And both animals appear
to use their knowledge to control their instincts. The
juvenile female uses her social awareness to enhance
her aggressive impulse; the adult female uses her social
awareness to inhibit her aggressive impulse.
But chimpanzees have social knowledge which is
habitual, too. A dominant male may maintain his status
for a time even after he is no longer able to defend it
(Goodall, ch. 15, pp. 410 and 429-30). And their social
interactions are habitual. Their hierarchies are usually
stable, though they do change over time (p. 410). Their
alliances are often very stable, especially between
siblings and other kin (pp 409-10 and 418-24).
We thus see that chimpanzees have both intellectual
and moral virtues of some kind. They have a habitual
knowledge of social relationships, and they use their
knowledge to control their instincts and to fonn social
habits. We cannot of course say with absolute certainty
that these animals use their intellect to perfonn any
action. But Kant reminds us that we cannot be entirely
certain that humans use their intellect to perform any
action. He argues that the grounds of our actions are
ultimately hidden even from ourselves (Groundwork
for the Metaphysics ofMorals 2. 406-9).
Chimpanzees also use their social knowledge in
other ways. They form coalitions to maintain or to
challenge their social hierarchy. Of course, their
awareness of an hierarchy itself serves to inhibit
aggression. For individuals who know their status can
calculate the probable outcome of conflicts and inhibit
their aggressive instincts (Goodall, ch. 12, p. 356; ch.
15, pp. 409-12). But coalitions between individuals of
high rank can help them maintain tlleir status in a
hierarchy, and coalitions between individuals of low
rank can help them improve their status. Such
arrangements are very frequent among chimpanzees
(Goodall, ch. 12, p. 318-9; ch. 15, pp. 418-24).
These animals can form coalitions and make attacks
on members of neighboring communities, too. These
attacks can be well coordinated and very brutal
(Goodall, ch. 12,p. 317; ch. 17, pp. 503-14). They also
cooperate when tbey hunt other animals. While other
chimpanzees position themselves to block off escape
routes, one chimpanzee may climb a tree in pursuit of a
baboon or monkey, for example, especially a juvenile
(Goodall, ch. 11, pp. 285-90).
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Chimpanzees control not only aggressive instincts
but also some appetites. They have social preferences
regarding food selection. Adults often discourage infants
from eating novel food items by snatching the food and
throwing it away, though infants do appear to be
responsible for some innovations in diet (Goodall, ch.
10, pp. 263-6). Sexual relationships are, however,
opportunistic. Even if they form an exclusive
relationship, chimpanzees do not remain together for
more than a few days (Goodall, ch. 16).
We thus see that wild chimpanzees possess some
practical knowledge and use this knowledge to control
their instincts. They can enhance and inhibit their
aggressive instincts and their appetites. And they do
so habitually.

III
Wild chimpanzees possess another intellectual virtue
of significance. They have a communicative art of a
very rudimentary sort. To show that they do, let us return
to Aristotle for a definition of an art of communication.
Aristotle does not present as explicit a definition of this
art as we might wish. But I believe that we can piece
his definition together without much difficulty.
Aristotle defines an art in general as a habit
constituting a capacity for production and following
from a principle (Eth. 6.4. 1140a3-5). The first phrase
of his definition indicates what differentiates practical
wisdom and art. As intellectual virtues, both practical
wisdom and art are mental habits. But wisdom of the
practical sort gives one the capacity to act, and an art of
any sort gives one the capacity to make (Eth. 6.4. 1140al3 and 1140a5-6). Though action does not, production
results in something being made (1140alO-17).
Though he does not discuss it, Aristotle indicates
with the second phrase what general similarities
practical wisdom and art have. Both practical wisdom
and art include virtues of intuition and deliberation. At
least, Aristotle implies that an art of communication
includes tllese virtues. Consider what he says about
rhetoric. What this art produces are speeches which
contain persuasive arguments (Rhetoric 1. 1. 1354a111355aI8). But he also asserts that this art concerns ends
and means. For rhetoricians do make speeches with an
intention of some kind. Their general intention is, of
course, to persuade us to act or not to act, but their
specific intentions allow us to divide speeches into
different kinds (Rhet.I. 3. 1358a36-1359a5).And their

21

Between the Species

Simian Virtue

speeches themselves are means to fulfilling their
intentions; these speeches especially constitute
persuasive arguments, though not always (Rller. 1. 2.
1355b25-1356a20).
Now wild chimpanzees appear to possess an
ability, even if a minimal one, to develop illl art of
communication. These animals have practical
knowledge not only of their social environment but also
of their natural environment. And they use their
knowledge of these environments to regulate crude
vocal communication. They are not in any way able to
make a persuasive argument, of course.
Chimpanzees have in fact a vocal repertoire of over
thirty different sounds. But their vocalizations are rather
inarticulate, for they include only grunts, squeaks,
screams, barks, pants, and hoots (Goodall, ch. 6. pp.
127, 129-31, and 134-6). Their vocalizations do,
however, serve them for conununication. At least, these
sounds alter the behavior of those who hear them in
very predictable ways (p. 125).
We shall consider a distance call known as the
inquiring pant-hoot. Chimpanzees, usually males, make
this pant-hoot during travel. They particularly like to
make it from high ridge tops. A call of this type has a
rise in pitch at the end of a series, and it is often
accompanied by tree drumming. The call itself provides
information about who a caller is and where he is. For
all pant-hoots reliably indicate the identity of a caller,
even to humans, and any pant-hoot indicates location
simply by being made. Of course, the call also provides
information about who an illlswerer is and where he is.
But do chimpanzees exhibit intentionality and
deliberation when they make an inquiring pant-hoot?
They appear to do so. They make this call with the
intention of finding out who else is nearby and where
they are. For a caller almost always engages in intent
listening or looking after making his call. A caller also
appears to use the information gained as a means to an
end. After receiving an answer, he then joins or avoids
an answerer (Goodall, ch. 6, p. 134).
These animals even more probably use their
knowledge of a situation to suppress their vocalization.
Consider the inquiring pant-hoot again. Chimpanzees do
not make any inquiring pant-hoots when they travel along
their territorial borders, where they are in danger of attack.
Though they may drum on trees, they maintain almost
total vocal silence in these area'>. And they sometimes
embrace noisy individuals until they become silent, or
they strike individuals who do not maintain silence. They
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even threaten human observers who are too noisy
(Goodall, ch. 17, pp. 490-1; ch. 19, pp. 579-80).
Chimpanzees also make their productions and
suppressions of inquiring pant-hoots habitual. They
make these pant-hoots not only when reaching a ridge
top but also at intervals when traveling and when lost
(Goodall, ch. 6, p. 134). And their silence along their
borders is quite typical. They have been observed to
maintain silence for more than three hours (Goodall,
ch. 17, pp. 490-1).
We thus see that chimpanzees very probably make
some vocalizations as means to ends. But again we
cannot say with absolute certainty that these animals
use their intellect to make any call. In fact, they
produce their vocalizations only in association with
an emotion, and they are able to produce them only
with great difficulty without an appropriate emotion
(Goodall, ch. 6, p. 125).
We concede that chimpanzees utter other vocalizations merely from impulse. They make another
distance call, dubbed the spontaneous pant-hoot,
without any apparent purpose, for example. They make
this pant-hoot during quiet feeding or resting, and they
do not at all listen for a response (Goodall, ch. 6, pp.
134-5). We also concede that they do not produce other
calls with an intention. One exception might be the
arrival pant-hoot, which males usually make when
arriving in camp (Goodall, ch. 6, p. 134). But
apparently these animals do intentionally inhibit other
calls, such as aggressive screams, copulation screams,
and food barks (ch. 6, p. 125; ch. 17, p. 490; ch. 19,
pp. 579-80).
In addition to a communicative art, chimpanzees
possess a more mundane art of making tools. Indeed,
they are probably best known for the fact that they make
and use objects as tools. For example, they make wands
and use them to fish for termites. They have the ability
to make their wands of different materials, such as grass,
vines, fronds, twigs, or bark. They must select what
material is available for length, and they often must
remove leaves or fibers from it. They also use these
wands intentionally. Twisting and turning it, they must
then insert the wand into a passage of a termite mound.
And, finally, they can extract and eat soldier termites
which attack the wand by biting it and clinging to it
(Goodall, ch. 18, pp. 536-9).
Chimpanzees, of course, possess a very keen ability
to manipulate objects even when they have not made
them. They also can direct their manipulations to attain
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goals, albeit immediate ones (Goodall, ch. 18, p. 536).
Male chimpanzees drag, wave, or hurl branches and
roll or throw rocks to enhance their aggressive displays
(pp. 549-50). Both males and females swing tree
branches up and down to whip others with them. They
also break off branches from trees and brandish them,
throw them, or club others with them (pp. 550-7).
They use sticks to enlarge openings in trees where
bird nests or bee hives might be. They crumple up leaves
and use them as sponges to drink water collected in
hollows of trees (Goodall, ch. 18, p. 539-2). And they
use leaves as napkins to wipe blood, fruit juice, urine, or
feces from their bodies (Goodall, ch. 18, pp. 545-8).
We see then that chimpanzees more likely than not
exhibit a communicative art. For they utter some
vocalizations with intentionality and deliberation, and
they do so from habit. We also see that they very likely
inhibit some vocalizations in the same way. And these
animals make tools for attaining ends and manipulate
objects to attain ends.
We might note that chimpanzees from different
communities exhibit variations in their production of
tools and in their use of tools and objects. Instead of
wands, some animals select and modify sticks to fish
for termites. And they push their stick into a termite
nest and pound it up and down. They then extract the
stick and eat crushed termites stuck to its end. These
animals also dip uncrumpled leaves into water and lick
the water off them. Chimpanzees in some communities
even use stones to crack open nuts (Goodall, eh. 18,
pp.542-5).

We would answer that chimpanzees do perform their
actions from habit. They have rather stable knowledge
of their hierarchy, and their hierarchy itself is also stable.
Their production and suppression of some vocalizations
is quite consistent. And so is their tool making.
But we do have to be more cautious about the
knowledge possessed by chimpanzees. We of course
concede that human beings and chimpanzees obviously
do not have knowledge of the some kind. We make no
attempt to argue that other animals possess theoretical
wisdom of any kind. To possess and exercise theoretical
wisdom would be well beyond these animals and their
capacities, for knowledge of this sort is knowledge of
eternal truth (Erh. 6. 3. and 6-7.).
More specifically, humans have theoretical
conceptions of intellectual and moral virtue and of
happiness. At least, we are capable of these conceptions.
But chimpanzees in all probability do not have a very
sophisticated conception of self. They appear at best
to have only a very particular conception of their
individual identities, their social relationships, and
their immediate surroundings. 6
Neither can we assert that these animals have other
practical intuitions of great sophistication, nor can we
say that they conduct sophisticated deliberations. But
they do have intuitions about their actions, and they
also deliberate about means to ends. We might ask the
ethologists if they could provide evidence to show
more clearly what kinds of truths these animals grasp
and what kinds of deliberations they perform (but see
Goodall, ch. 2).7
Do chimpanzees choose their actions? If they act
after deliberation, they do. Aristotle, Hobbes, and other
philosophers define choice simply as action taken after
deliberation (see Eth. 3.2.; and Lev. 1. 6.). Their range
of choice is, however, not very wide because their
knowledge is so limited. But we might again ask the
ethologists what kinds of control they have over their
impulses. Do they have complete control over any
impulse? And what sort of impulse can they control?
But, clearly, these animals do not choose their action
for its own sake. They most likely act for the sake of
tlle consequences of their action. For example, they do
not maintain their hierarchy for its own sake. Dominant
males and females seek their status for the sake of
psychological and physiological advantages (Goodall,
ch. 15, p. 442).
We see, then, that chimpanzees possess mental
and moral habits with apparent similarities and

IV

Now, someone might object that our conclusions go
too far. One could concede that chimpanzees have some
conception of means and ends and that these animals
can probably use these conceptions to control some
behavior. Perhaps, they can even develop habits. But
one might still object that to act as someone who has
virtue acts is not necessarily to act virtuously. Aristotle
himself might raise this objection. He points out that
we may perform actions which accord with justice
merely by chance. Or we may by chance speak in
accordance with good grarrunar. He explains that though
production does not, virtuous action rests on three
conditions. An action of this sort must follow from
knowledge, it must be chosen for its own sake, and it
must result from habit (Erlt. 2. 4.).
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dissimilarities to human virtue. But perhaps we also
ought to ask ourselves how well we measure up to
classical virtue ethics. How many of us have a good
grasp of the classical conceptions of virtue and
happiness? And if we understand them, how often are
we able to embody these conceptions in our actions?
How much control are we able to exhibit over our
emotions? And how often do we choose our actions for
their own sakes?8

Notes
1 Contemporary philosophers who dispute about our
obligations to other animals tend to neglect the conception of
virtue because they concern themselves almost exclusively
with the ability of an animal to reason or to feel pleasure and
pain. For example, see R.G.Frey, Interests and Rights (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1980) or Peter Singer, Animal Liberation
(New York: Avon Books, 1975). A noteworthy exception is
Sapontzis. See S. F. Sapontzis, Morals, Reason, andAnimals
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), esp. ch. 3.

v

2 Rollin advocates a teleological ethics for animals, for
example. See Bernard E. Rollin, Animal Rights and Human
Morality (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1981).

We have discovered, then, that other primates have some
rudimentary virtues of their own. At least, they clearly
develop some mental and moral habits of their own.
We have, however, attempted to analyze their virtue only
in a general sense and not in any special sense. In future
inquiries we might accordingly wish to ask what specific
virtues other primates may possess. One especially
important virtue to consider would be justiceY
But our discovery also entails some ethical
implications for our relationships with other animals.
Very probably other primates besides chimpanzees
have virtues of some sort, and other mammals may
have them, too. If so, we may have uncovered a general
basis for an ethics of animal virtue. A virtue ethics for
animals would, of course, serve to bolster attempts to
advance a teleological ethics for animals, for a virtue
of any kind has an end in its activity.lo A virtue ethics
would also override some objections to a utilitarian
ethics for animals. For an ethics of this kind need not
rest on the mere ability to feel pleasure and pain. II
We may consequently find that we have higher
obligations than we thought to animals other than
humans. These animals appear to be intellectually and
morally better than we might have imagined. They
can develop intellectual and moral virtue not entirely
dissimilar to our own. We would thus appear to have
an obligation to respect their capacity to form these
habits and to exercise them. Merely to respect their
capacity to feel pleasure and pain would not be
sufficient.
But our discovery of animal virtue also tells us
something about ourselves. Indeed, Goodall made her
study of chimpanzees for this very purpose (Goodall,
intro., p. 3). If they do not measure up to our highest
aspirations, these animals do appear to come rather
close to our quotidian virtues. Perhaps our aspirations
have prevented us from noting their achievements.
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3 Exactly what facts practical wisdom grasps is a bone of
contention among classical scholars. For a discussion of this
issue, one might consult Norman Dahl, Practical Reason,
Aristotle, and Weakness ofthe Will (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1984), esp. app. 1.
4 Jane Goodall, The Chimpanzees ofGombe (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1986). Also see Frans de Waal,
Chimpanzee Politics (New York: Harper and Row,
Publishers, 1982).

5 Goodall also provides a good synopsis of the literature
on these chimpanzees (Goodall, ch. 2).
6 Frey would appear to assume that other animals would
have to have a moral theory in order to be rational. For he
argues that they would have to possess a language in order to
have any beliefs. See Frey, ch. 7. And Frey is not alone. For
example, see Donald Davidson, "Rational Animals,"
Dialectica 36 (1982) 317-28; or Jonathan Bennett,
"Thoughtful Brutes," Proceedings and Addresses of the
American Philosophical Association 62 (1988-89) 197- 210.
We may trace this view back at least to Descartes (Discourse
on Method 5.). But language is surely a prerequisite of
theoretical reason rather than of practical reason. Hobbes made
this point (Leviathan 1. 5.). Other philosophers reach
conclusions similar to ours. See, for example, Rollin, pt. 1;
Sapontzis, chs. 3 and 7; Stephen R. L Clark, The Nature of
the Beast (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), ch. 3; Tom
Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1983), chs. 1- 2. On this topic one might
also consider Robert J. Mclaughlin, "Language and Man,"
Thomist 45 (1981) 541-70.
7 Clark, Regan, Rollin, and Sapontzis all reach conclusions
similar to ours.
8

Compare Sapontzis, ch. 3, pp. 41-6.

9 Sociobiologists of course study other primate
communities and their structures. But they do so with the
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intention of discovering not how much these primates
resemble humans but rather how much we resemble them.
See Edward O. Wilson, On Human Nature (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1978), for example.

Announcement

10 Rollin advocates a teleological ethics based primarily
if not exclusively on biological functions. He would thus
appear to overlook any role animal rationality might play in
modifying these functions. See Rollin, pt. 1.

A summer course on
Ethical Issues ofAnimal Research
will be held
June 24-29, 1995,
on campus at
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C.

11 Singer of course presents the utilitarian argument that
the ability to feel pleasure and pain is what gives animals a
right to equal moral consideration. This argument would be
more appropriate for animals which exhibit little or no
rationality. See Singer, ch. 1.

The course is open to college faculty and
others who would like to improve their
skills in teaching about elbical issues
surrounding the use of animals as
research subjects. Emphasis will be on
how to use this course material in
classroom instruction.
Topics include the moral status of
nonhuman animals, lbe justification for
using animals as experimental subjects,
ethical concerns about vulnerable
subjects, student objections, lbe use of
alternatives, animal harms and pain,
legal issues, and the importance of
species. Varying points of view will be
presented in a well-balanced fasbion.
The course directors are F. Barbara
Orlans, Ph.D., and Tom L. Beauchamp,
Pb.D., bolb of the Kennedy Institute of
Elbics, Georgetown University.
For more information, contact:
Moheba Hanif
Kennedy Institute of Ethics
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C., 20057
Tel: 202-687-6833
FAX: 202-687-8089
email: banifm@guvax.georgetown.edu
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